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Abstract
In this paper, we present an on-line electronic payment system for low-value transaction. We use the concept of signcryption for
each communication between any pair of entities and offers token updation instantly as an add-on feature to existing on-line e-cash
systems where token is the payment instrument (containing electronic cash) which acts as an electronic wallet. In our system, the
token is issued and authenticated by Issuing Bank (token issuer). Merchant verifies the user and sends authenticated transaction
details to Issuing Bank. Later Issuing Bank verifies approval of both customer and merchant. The merchant is also verified by its
financial institution. Unlike the existing e-payment system question of double spending of e-cash arises because each transaction
are made uniquely identifiable and updation is instantly done by Issuing bank. Hence no separate protocols are needed to be
developed for handling disputes. The proposed scheme provide anonymity, authenticity, confidentiality and fairness.
c⃝ 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Department of Computer Science &
Engineering, National Institute of Technology Rourkela.
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1. Introduction
The growth of the Internet, in the last years, has created an electronic market place for goods and services. Trading
tangible goods is not the only way to earn money in this new virtual market place. Information or more generally
intangible goods will become important gradually. While at this moment, many sites offer intangible goods free and
this may change soon. Producers will sell knowledge, executable programs, images, music or videos over the Internet
and deliver these goods electronically. Electronic payment system plays a crucial role, acts as a backbone of this
virtual market place. For security consideration, cryptographic primitives are used in electronic payment system. If a
payment system is to succeed on the Internet, the computational efforts in using these primitives need to be optimized.
Many authors proposed schemes (Zheng 1997), (Anand & Madhavan 2000), (Steve Glassman & Sobalvarro 1995),
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(He & TC-Wu 1999), (Hwang & Sung 2006), (Erik-Oliver Blass & Strufe 2009) for electronic payment systems.
In this work, we consider electronic payment systems in which the payment instrument is token (which is an elec-
tronic wallet) containing electronic cash (E-cash). Our proposed scheme is based on on-line e-payment systems where
the transfer of electronic money between the payer (customer) and payee (merchant) takes place in the presence of
a third party (usually, a Bank), that guarantees the authenticity of the token being used in a transaction. Verification
of both customer and merchant are done by their respective financial institute respectively. Token information and
transaction details are kept confidential. Both authentication and confidentiality walk on hand-in-hand simultane-
ously by signcryption technique [1]. To our best knowledge, none of the existing electronic payment system follows
signcryption technique. The proposed scheme is so designed that it guarantees fairness to both the parties, namely
the customer and the merchant. By fairness, we mean that none of the parties can dishonour a transaction. As each
transaction is made unique and token containing e-cash value is updated instantly by Issuing bank, therefore double
spending does not arise. The token has a certain lifetime. After each transaction, token need not be renewed. The
balance amount can be carried over in the next transaction.
2. Brief overview of Anand and Madhavan’s protocol
In this section, we describe Anand and Madhavan’s e-cash payment protocol (Anand & Madhavan 2000) which
guarantees anonymity, fairness and transferability. There are three parties involved in the basic coin exchange mech-
anism: the Payer, designated as the Customer (C), the Payee, called a Merchant (M) and a Verifying Authority (VA).
In a transaction the coins are transferred from C to M and the coins are verified by the VA. The VA,s job is two-fold:
First, he has to verify that the coin has not been spent previously and next, he needs to affix his signature along with
requisite information on the coin to allow the merchant M to spend the coin later.
There are three basic protocols namely, 1) Coin Withdrawal/Deposit protocol; 2) Basic Coin Exchange protocol; and
3) Resolution Protocol.
We use the following notations for the rest of the paper.
∙ SX (MESG): A signature on a message, MESG, by an entity X
∙ H(.): A strong collision resistant one-way hash function.
∙ f(.): A strong collision resistant one-way hash function
∙ Ek(.): A symmetric-key encryption algorithm characterized by key K
∙ Dk(.): A decryption algorithm characterized by key K
∙ KXY : A symmetric key between two entities X and Y
In this system, a coin (COIN), is a bit string consisting of three parts. The format of the COIN is shown below.
[SB(SNO, DENM, EXPD, TS)], [SVA0(VA1, TS0, H(SNO, TS))], [VA0] The first part has the fields, serial number
(SNO), denomination of the coin (DENM), expiry date of the coin (EXPD) and the timestamp of issue (TS). This
part is signed by the bank using its private key. The second part consists of the name of the next verifying authority
(VA1), a timestamp (TS0) at which verification is been done and the hash of serial number (SNO) and timestamp of
issue (TS) which are fields of the first part. The second part is then signed by the present verifying authority (VA0).
At issue stage, the present verifying authority is the bank B itself. The third part of the coin is the name of the present
verifying authority (VA0). The first part of the coin remains unchanged throughout the lifetime of the coin, that is till
its expiry date.
The basic Coin Exchange Protocol of this scheme is depicted in Figure 1 below.
Coin verification : The verification of the COIN is done as follows: First, VAi verifies from the second part that he
is indeed the current valid verifying authority. Next, VAi checks if the SNO appearing on the COIN is listed in his
database. If not, then the COIN is authentic and VAi proceeds to sign the COIN. If the COIN is listed in his database,
he checks the timestamp appearing on the second part of the COIN. If this timestamp is greater than the time stamp in
the database corresponding to the SNO of the COIN, then the COIN is authentic. If both of the above conditions are
violated then the COIN is treated as double spent and a REJECT signal is conveyed to M. The entries that need to be
made in the verifying authority,s database when a COIN is found to be authentic are: (a) the SNO, if it is not already










SM (TID , DESC , PRICE, TS  )
EVAi ( COIN, PRICE, H( TID , DESC , PRICE, TS  )), VAi
Step 4:
VAi
EVAi ( COIN, PRICE, H( TID , DESC , PRICE, TS  ))





Verifies COIN sends OK/ REJECT
Sends signed COIN on OK encrypted with KMV
Step 6:
C
Receipt for GOODS or REJECT
M
Fig. 1. Basic Coin Exchange Protocol
in the database and (b) the timestamp (TS) of previous verification which appears in the second part. If the COIN is
verified as being authentic, the verifying authority,VAi, needs to sign it. This signing is done by replacing the second
part of the COIN. The second part will now contain the new timestamp (TSi) at which the COIN is being verified, the
next verifying authority,s name (VAi+1) and the hash value that existed in the replaced part. Of course, he may also
verify that the hash value is correct by doing the hash computation. The third part of the COIN is replaced by the
name of the present verifying authority,VAi.
∙ Coin being verified by VAi:
SB(SNO, DENM, EXPD, TS ), SVAi−1 (VAi, TSi−1, H(SNO, TS)), VAi−1
∙ Coin after Signature by VAi:
SB(SNO,DENM,EXPD,TS),SVAi(VAi+1,TSi,H(SNO,TS)),VAi
∙ Coin Withdrawal Protocol:








Fig. 2. Coin Withdrawal Protocol
[AMT: amount; SPEC: the change required; ACCTNO: account number]
∙ Coin Deposit Protocol:
The diagram below explains Coin Deposit Protocol
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Step 1:
B
EB (COINS, ACCTNO ),  VA k
Step 2:
     VA k B
Verify COINS
C
Fig. 3. Coin Deposit Protocol
Resolution Protocol
Step 1: C sends a resolve request with the signed message obtained from merchant M and a hash of the coins he had
used in the transaction to the verifying authorityVAi at which the coin was sent.
Step 2: VAi on receipt of the request checks the signature of M and if found valid checks when the coins spent were
authenticated by it. If the claim of C is found correct, VAi directs M to transfer the goods. If M does not accept then
the coins transferred to it are invalidated by sending an appropriate message to VAi+1. Also, the coins spent by C are
restored to it so that C does not lose money in the aborted transaction.
3. Proposed scheme
3.1. Overview
The proposed E-cash system consists of following four entities.
1. Issuing Bank (IB) who issues token, validates existing tokens and exchanges E-cash(token) for real money.
2. Customer (C) who can buy tokens (updatable) from IB with exchange of real money and can purchase intangible
products from Merchants, paying via electronic media.
3. Merchants (M) who can accept tokens in payment for information items.
4. Acquiring Bank (AB) where Merchants have accounts. AB validates the merchant.
In a transaction, the following events are taken place:
At first, Setup is constructed by a central authority (third party).
Step 1 (C⇒ IB): The customer pays IB for the token.
Step 2 (IB⇒C): IB issues signed token for C and send securely to C.
Step 3 (C⇒M): C inserts token, choose an item from M’s homepage and sends order information (OI) to M. C also
sends some secret information for IB (via M) which helps it to verify C.
Step 4 (M⇒IB): Merchant appends price details, and its own id (IDM) to OI. Then M forwards the signcrypted
modified OI to IB.
Step 5 (IB⇒AB): IB retrieves the token information with its private key. It verifies the customer and ensure that
merchant forwarded token message is genuinely sent by Customer and the OI is the corresponding requisition detail
requested by the Customer in this transaction. IB also verifies its own signature and then sends merchant details to
AB for confirmation.
Step 6 (AB⇒IB): AB verifies and sends acknowledgement to IB.
Step 7 (IB⇒M): IB sends ok/reject signal to merchant.
Step 8 (M⇒C):Merchant sends receipt for sold items/reject to customer.
Step 9 (IB⇒AB): IB updates e-cash value, transaction id, transaction time in the token and then transfers the fund
and sends transaction details to AB.
Step 10 (AB⇒IB): AB updates M’ s account and sends confirmation to IB.
934   Arpita Mazumdar and Debasis Giri /  Procedia Technology  6 ( 2012 )  930 – 938 
Step 11 (IB⇒C): On receiving the confirmation IB commits the transaction and further sign the modified token and
send acknowledgement to C.
Step 12 (AB⇒M): AB sends acknowledge to merchant.
Note: X ⇒Y means X sends some information to Y.
In our system, the format of the token information (TI) is shown below
TOKENID SEQNO. CUSTID EXPIRES TS VALUE PROPS
TOKENID : Unique identification number of a token; SEQNO. : Unique sequence number for each transaction;
CUSTID : Customer identification number; EXPIRES : Lifespan of a token; TS : Time stamp of a transaction; VALUE
: Monetary value; PROPS : other information;
Moreover the format of Order Information (OI) is shown below
TOKENID ITEMCODE SEQNO.
ITEMCODE : unique code for an item for sale.




   1. pays for token
2. Receives token.

























account & sends ack .
12. sends ack .
Fig. 4. Block diagram of proposed scheme
3.2. Detailed description of the Scheme
In the following, we describe the setup phase of the proposed scheme.
Setup There exists a central authority who generates the system wide public parameter p (large prime) and g (genera-
tor over Z∗p). Also another prime q is chosen such that q∣p−1. Let U be an user in the system. Then xu ∈ Z∗q is private
key and yu= gxumod p is the corresponding public key of the user U. Hence (xB,yB), (xu,yu) and (xm,ym) are the key
pairs of Bank, Customer and Merchant respectively.
Steps in the figure 4 are elaborately described below.
Step 1: The Customer pays IB for a token.
Step 2 (Generation of signcrypted token information): IB sends token to the customer using signcryption. Sign-
crypted message is generated by the IB using its private key and C’s public key, C can verify the signcrypted message
and recover the original message with the help of C’s private key and IB’s public key.
Signcrypted token information (TI) as (c,h,s,v) is generated by IB for C.
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Customer ( C) IB
1. pays for token
2. Receives  token ( c ,h,s,v)
Fig. 5. Token issuance
1. Compute encryption key K as K = f (TI)xB mod p, where f is a one-way function that maps from {0,1}∗ to Z∗q
2. Compute c= EK(TI), where E is a symmetric-key encryption algorithm.
3. Compute v= f (TI)
4. choose randomly r ∈ Z∗p
5. Compute e= f (yru mod p,c)
6. Compute h= K ⋅ e mod q
7. Compute s= r(h+ xB)−1 mod q
Verification of Signcrypted message: After receiving (c,h,s,v) from IB, C verifies it as follows.
1. Compute e= f ((yB ⋅gh)s.xu mod p,c)
2. Compute K = h ⋅ e−1 mod q
3. Compute TI = DK(c), where D is a symmetric-key decryption algorithm.
4. Compute vc = f (T I) C verifies whether vc = v. If true, C accepts the token as valid else rejects.
Step 3 (Generation of dual signature): Customer further signs the signed token (TI∥h∥s) and sends the dual signed
token along with OI securely to Merchant. Merchant forwards the signed token to IB. IB can only retrieve the token
value and verify its signature on it.
Customer ( C) Merchant ( M)
1. inserts token,choose an item from home page
2. sends  order requisition ( OI )
Fig. 6. placing order requisition
Signature generation by customer: Suppose, msg = (TI∥h∥s). Customer signs on msg. Customer sends X2 =
(c2,h2,s2,v2) to IB via Merchant, and sends X1 = (c1,h1,s1,v1) to Merchant, where the component of X1 and X2 are
described below.
1. C computes encryption key K1 = f (OI)xu mod p
2. Compute c1 = E(K1,OI)
3. Compute v1 = f (OI)
4. Randomly choose t ∈ Z∗p
5. Compute e1=f(ytm mod p,c1)
6. Compute h1 = K1.e1 mod q
7. Compute s1 = t(h1 + xu)−1 mod q
8. Randomly choose x ∈ Z∗p
9. Compute key k = yxB mod p
10. Compute c2 = k ⋅msg mod p
11. Compute v2 = f (msg)
12. Randomly choose w ∈ Z∗p
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13. Compute e2=f(ywB mod p,c2)
14. Compute h2 = k ⋅ e2 mod q
15. Compute s2 = w(h2 + xu)−1 mod q
Verification byMerchant: After receiving the message X1 and X2 from customer, Merchant verifies thatOI has come
from customer in the following manner. M cannot calculate e2, in tern cannot decrypt c2, it forwards (c2,h2,s2,v2) to
IB.
1. Calculate e1 = f ((yu ⋅gh1)s1⋅xm mod p,c1)
2. Compute K1 = h1 ⋅ e−11 mod q
3. Compute OI = D(K1,c1)
4. Compute vm = f (OI)
Merchant verifies whether computed value vm and value of v1 sent by customer is same or not. If same, it ensures that
OI has not been altered and come from an authentic customer.
Step 4 (Forwarding token information): After verification M appends its own ID that is IDM, price with OI. This
Modified Order Information, MOI = (OI∥IDM∥price∥IDAB) where IDAB is the identity of acquiring bank. After
that Merchant sends modified transaction details X3 = (c3,h3,s3,v3) to IB and also forwards signed message X2 =
(c2,h2,s2,v2) of customer. Description of each parameter of X3 are given below.
Merchant ( M) IB
sends modified OI  securely( c3 ,h3, s3 ,v3 )
Forwards signed message of customer( c2 ,h2, s2 ,v2 )
Fig. 7. Forward Token information
1. Compute encryption key K3 = f (MOI)xm mod p
2. Compute c3 = E(K3,MOI)
3. Compute v3 = f (MOI)
4. Randomly choose d ∈ Z∗p
5. Compute e3 = f (ydB mod p,c3)
6. Compute h3 = K3 ⋅ e3 mod q
7. Compute s3 = d(h3 + xm)−1 mod q
Verification: After receiving X3, IB executes the following steps.
Verifying merchant details :
1. Compute gd = gs3.(h3+xm) mod p
2. Compute e3 = f ((gd)xB ,c3) [= f (gxB⋅s3(h3+xm) mod q mod p,c3) = f ((gh3 ⋅gxm)s3⋅xB mod p,c3) = f ((gh3 ⋅ym)s3⋅xB mod
p,c3)]
3. Compute K3 = h3 ⋅ e−13 mod q
4. Compute MOI = D(K3,c3)
5. Compute vBM = f (MOI)
IB verifies that computed MOI has come from Merchant by checking the condition v3 = vBM.
After receiving the message X2 = (c2,h2,s2,v2) of Customer forwarded by Merchant, IB verifies the authenticity of
Customer and then retrieves the token message in the following manner.
IB recalculates the key for verifying the customer details
1. Compute e2 = f ((gh2 ⋅ yu)s2⋅xB mod p,c2)
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2. Compute key= h2 ⋅ e−12 mod q
3. Compute msg= c2 ⋅ key−1 mod p
4. Compute vBC = f (msg)
IB checks both the conditions (vBC = v2) and (TOKENID,SEQNO. of TI = TOKENID,SEQNO. of OI) and if both
are true then IB will ensure that merchant forwarded token message is genuinely sent by Customer and the OI is the
corresponding requisition detail requested by the Customer in this transaction. IB also recalculates h,s from token
message (TI) and matches with sent values h and s. Then IB verifies its own signature.
Step 5: IB encrypts the (IDM∥TS1) with the shared symmetric key KIB,AB between IB and AB and sends the encrypted
message to AB for confirmation.
Step 6: If M has a valid account, AB sends EkIB,AB(TS2) as acknowledgement, where TS2 = TS1 +1.
Step 7: After verifying that both customer and merchant are authentic IB sends OK signal to merchant.
Step 8: M on receipt of an OK signal sends a receipt for items to C.
Step 9: IB updates the following in the token SEQNO.= next SEQNO.
VALUE =VALUE− price.
TS=current TS
IB sends EKIB,AB (IDM∥price∥n1) to AB, where n1 is a random nonce.
Note: Check [TS > TS2] must hold which means only after receiving acknowledgement (TS2) from AB, updation is
performed by IB.
Step 10: AB updates M’ s account by balance= balance+price. AB confirms by sending f (IDAB∥n1) to IB.
Step 11: IB commits the updation in token as well as in database. IB further signs the modified token and sends
f (SEQNO.) as acknowledge to customer.
Step 12: AB sends { f (IDAB∥n2),n2} as acknowledgement to merchant where n2 is a random nonce.
4. Security analysis
Our proposed scheme is based on a cryptographic primitive termed ’signcryption’ in which message encryption and
digital signature are simultaneously performed. Therefore, it requires less computational cost and less communication
overhead than conventional signature then encryption approaches.
Basically, a signcryption scheme should satisfy the following properties:
Unforgeability: It is computationally infeasible for an adaptive attacker to masquerade as the signcrypter is creating
a signcrypted text.
Confidentiality: It is computationally infeasible for an adaptive attacker to find out any secret information from a
signcrypted text.
Non repudiation: It is computationally feasible for a judge to settle a dispute between the signcrypter and the recipient
in an event where the signcrypter denies the fact that he is the sender of the signcrypted text to the recipient.
The signcyption approach in our proposed scheme possess all the 3 properties:
∙ As signature and encryption is not separable, forgery attacks are not likely to occur. Calculation of e is dependent
on c where c has a relation with message TI. Moreover,h is dependent on e and in tern s is dependent on h.
∙ As message is encrypted with unique key in each transaction, to find out any secret information from signcrypted
text is computationally infeasible.
∙ A signcrypter can not repudiate his signature as signature is done by its private key and is related to message.
In the following, we describe the security of our scheme for step 2. Suppose, an adversary can know the value of
c,h,s,v. To break the security of the scheme he has to know the value of xB, e, r, K, message which is computationally
impossible.
The adversary might solve the private key xB from the following equation s=r(h+xB)−1mod q and given c,hv. This im-
plies that the adversary can compute xB from the above equation, if r is known to the adversary from e= f (yrBmod p,c),
which is again computationally infeasible due to the discrete logarithm problem. The security of the scheme relies on
the hardness of the classical Discrete Logarithm problem in a subgroup of the group Z∗p, for large prime p. Hence, it is
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computationally infeasible to an adversary to attack in this manner. Analogously, we can prove the security for other
steps of our proposed protocol.
5. Comparison
In this section, we compare our scheme with previously published schemes namely Veni Madhavan and Anand’s
scheme and Hwang and Sung’s scheme. The comparison (in Table 1) shows that in our proposed scheme updation
of Token value can be done instantly unlike the others. There is no special verification for double spending detection
of token. Tokens are so designed they can not be double spent. Moreover customer’s identity is not revealed by
Merchant.
Table 1. Comparison of security features
Scheme Updation of Double spending Anonymity
TOKEN value detection
Veni Madhavan No Verification done by Anonymous
and Anand’s consulting database
Hwang and Sung’s No Before each transaction pseudonymous
C sends unique infor-
mation by Encryption
Our Yes Token can’t be pseudonymous
double spent
Anonymous: Customer’s identity is not revealed by the Merchant.
Pseudonymous: Customer’s identity is associated with TOKEN still Merchant can’t reveal customer’s identity.
6. Conclusion
We have designed a security protocol for on-line electronic payment system using the technique of signcryption
mechanism in which token information can be updated by Issuing bank. We have then described the security analysis
of our proposed scheme.
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